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Abstract:
We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs
(199(i)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of prod-
uct sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties
that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy pmfiles lack.
Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for the theory of equilibrium
refinements.
1 Introduction
A series of recent papers characterize solutions for strategic games using the
axiom of "consistency", and sotue complementary axioms. This ]iterature
focuses on point-valued solutions which assign to each game a collection of
strategy profiles. In this paper we extend these ideas to apply to set-valued
solutions which assign a collection of product sets of strategies to each game.
Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for the theory of equilibrium
refinements. The motivation of our study is as follows:
According to the classical view, game theory is a normative science with
the aim to offer "self-enforcing recommendations" to rational players (see
e.g. i{ohlberg and Mertens (1986, footnote 3) or van Damme (1987, pp 1-
3)). Most game theoretic solutions are point-valued. If the solution is a good
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1one, each profile selected should have the property that, once recommended
to the players, none of them should have an incentive to deviate.
However, there are several reasons why one might prefer to study set-
valued solutions, where each player is recommended a set of strategies. First,
as argued by Basu and Weibull (]991), there is no obvious reason why
recommendations should take the form of a single strategy rather than a set
of strategies. Second, if one does not consider mixed strategies as reasonable
objects of choice (see e.g. Ariel Rubinstein's arguments in Osborne and
Rubinstein (1994), Section 3.2.1) then in many games no equilibria exist
while appropriate set-valued solutions might have no such problems. Third,
some notions that arise in decision-theoretic approaches to analyzing games,
like the product set of rationalizable strategies (Bernheim (1984), Pearce
(1984)), fit quite nicely into the framework of set-valued solutions. Fourth,
in many games snmP player will have no "strict" incentive to comaly with a
recommended profile because he has multiple optimal choices given that all
others comply. If all such strategies are made part of the recommendation,
this will come as a strategy set. Similar concerns presumably motivate
Nash's (1951) notion of "strict solvability", and certainly motivate the work
of Basu and Weibull (1991) and Hurkens (1995, see especially pp 13-14).5
Peleg and Tijs (1998) introduce the axiom of "consistency" for point-
valued solutions and show that it is a useful axiom for characterizing and
understanding these solutions.s Intuitively, a solution is consistent if any
profile selected by this solution is also selected in any "reduced game", in
which only a subset of the players is active as before while the remaining
players make choices in accordance with the profile under consideration and
then "leave the game". A recent literature has emerged which elaborates
on these ideas.~ This "traditional" literature focuses exclusively on point-
SWe note that in the early days of game theory set-valued solutions were in focus.
In a two-person zero-sum game, the set of strategy profiles, in which each player uses a
maxminimizer strategy, has a product structure, and this observation is central to von
;Veumann's (1928) claim that he can solve zero-sum games. Nash's (1951) various notions
of solutions of (solvable) games are product sets of strategies (he never promotes equilibri-
um pomts as solutions!). In contemporary game theory set-valued solutions are in íocus in
Basu and Weibull (1991), Hurkens (1995,1996), and also in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).
However, the "stable sets" of Kohlberg and Mertens need not have a product structure,
and so fit less conveniently into the recommendation setting we have described.
sConfer also Salonen (1992) who conducts an analysis of the Nash equilibrium concept
using an axiom closely related to consistency.
'See Pe:eg and Sudhólter (1994), Patrone, Pieri, Tijs, and Torre (1995), van Heumen,
Peleg, Tijs, and Borm (1996), Norde, Potters, Reijnierse, and Vermeulen (1996), van den
Nouweland, Peleg, and Tija (1996), Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) and Ray (1996).
2valued solutions.
The consistency principle and the notion of a reduced game can be readi-
ly extended to set-valued solutions. }lowever, a"leaving playern of a reduced
game is not necessarily restricted to make one particular choice, so such a
game has as many players as its parent game. This is in contrast to the set-
up of Peleg and Tijs (1996), where reductions always decrease the number
of players. In order to allow for a comparison of results it is necessary to
somewhat modify the traditional theory. A game, reduced with respect to
some particular profile, is viewed as a game with the same number of players
as the original game, but with a subset of players restricted to choose from
singleton strategy sets containing only the strategy prescribed by the profile.
A central axiom, complementary to consistency, in Peleg and Tijs (1996)
is that of "one-person rationality", which imposes a rationality requirement
on decision making in games with only one player. This axiom has cutting
power in the theory of Peleg and Tijs because reduced games have fewer
players than parent games. With our new view of reductions this a~ciom no
longer works however. We replace it by another axiom, "rationality", which
imposes a rationality requirement on decision making in any game. Then,
the essence of the analysis of Peleg and Tijs (1996) can be recaptured in the
new framework we propose.
We then turn to set-valued solutions, focusing on the class of finite games.
We generalize several axioms used in the traditional approach, present a few
set-valued solutions, and investigate whether these satisfy the new axioms.
We ask what set-valued solutions satisfy those axioms that generalize the
axioms that can characterize the Nash equilibrium concept in the traditional
approach. The answer is somewhat surprising: The collection of singleton
sets, each involving a Nash equilibrium, is not uniquely implied. Other
solutions too qualify, for example the collection of product strategy sets
with the "best response property" in the sense of Pearce (1984), which
turns out to be the largest solution satisfying consistency and rationality. We
henceforth refer to this solution as BRP. This solution has the virtue ofbeing
non-empty for the class of finite games, something "the Nash singletons"
solution does not achieve.
For the traditional approach, Norde, Potters, Reijnierse, and Vermeulen
(1996) have shown that if one insists that a solution selects a non-empty
collection of profiles for each game that possesses a Nash equilibrium, then
one cannot move towards refinements of Nash equilibria without producing
inconsistent solutions. This has been viewed as a set-back to the theories
of equilibrium refinements and equilibrium selection (see e.g. the discussion
3between Eric van Damme and Robert Aumann in the interview Aumann
(1996, pp 28-30)). Given the finding reported in the previous paragraph, we
suggest and discuss the possibility that one should instead focus on BRP and
try to refine that solution while retaining consistency and other properties
deemed desirable.
In order to exemplify this line ot research we use Basu and Weibull's
(1991) notion of a set "closed under rational behavior" to isolate refine-
ments of BRP which are set-valued analogues of the strict equilibrium so-
lution (Harsanyi (1973)). Such refinements may have considerable cutting
power, as we illustrate using an example due to Hurkens (1996). We prove
that the desirable properties satisfied by BRP still hold.
Notation. Throughout this paper strict inclusion is denoted by C and
weak inclusion by c-
2 Point-valued solutions
The main aim of this section is to modify the axiom of "consistency" for
poiut-valued solutions, introduced by Peleg and Tijs (1996), such that it
may be viewed as a special case oí the cousistency principle ior set-valued
solutions, which will be defined in 5ection 3. Moreover we will rephrase
some of the traditional results in this new setting.
Throughout this paper we focus on finite strategic games. Such a game
is a tuple G -C N, A, u ~, where N is the finite player set, A- II;Ep~A; is
the product set of the finite strategy sets A; (i E N), and u -(u;);EN is the
vector of payoff functions u; : A-~ IR (i E N). If ~A;~ - 1 then i is called a
dummy player of the game G. Let I' be the collection of all finite strategic
games. A point-valued solution on I' is a map ~ which assigns to every game
G-c N,A,u ~E r a collection of strategy profiles in A. An example of a
point-valued solution is the solution NE which assigns to every game G E P
the sat of Nash equilibria of G:
NE(G) -{a : a is a Nash equilibrium of G}.
The central axíom in the traditional approach to characterization of point-
valued solutions is that of consistency. The version of this axiom we use is
based on the following notion oí a reduced game.
For a finite game G-G N,A,u ~, for a coalition S C N, and for
a strategy profile a- (a;)iEN E A the reduced game oJ G with respect
4to S and a is the game Gs,{a} -~ N H;ESA; x H;EN`s{a;},à ~, where
u-(u;)iEN ~s the vector of restrictions of the payoff functions u; (i E N)
to H;ESA; x H;EN`s{a;}. Note that the reduced game Gs,{a} belongs to
r. Gs,{a} has as many players as the game G, because the players in N`S
are still present as dummy players, whereas in the classical definition of the
notion oí reduced game these players leave the game. It is allowed that
S- 0, in which case the game Gs,{a} has only dummy players.
Definition 2.1 A point-valued solution ~ on I' satisfies consistency (CONS)
if for every G-G N,A,u ~E I', S C N, a E~(G) we have a E~(Gs,{a})
A second common axiom in the characterizations in the traditional literature
deals with optimization in one-person games. In Peleg and Tijs (1996) and
Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) the axiom of one-person-mtionality (OPR) is
used, requiring the selection afall maximizcrs in one-psrsor, games, whereas
in Norde et al. (1996) the weaker axiom of utility mazimization (UM) is
used, which requires the selection of a subset of the set of all maximizers
in one-person games. The axioms (OPR) and (UM) work well in these
cases, because reduction of games involves a reduction of the number of
players. However, in our present definition of the notion of reduced game, thc
number of players is not reduced and (OPR) or (UM) can not be used. As a
substitute we propose the axiom of rationality. In the definition of this axiom
below the set 0(HiEfy`{;}A}) is the collection of probability distributions
(beliefs) over H}EN`{;}A} and we write u;(a;,p-;) for the expected utility
for player i if he plays strategy a; and the other players play a strategy
profile according to the probability distribution ~-; E ~(HiEN`{t}Ai)-
Definition 2.2 A point-valued solution ~ on I' satisfies mtionality (RAT)
if for every G-G N,A,u 7E I', for every b- (b;);EN E 45(G) and
for every ti E N there exists an Y.-; E 0(H~EN`{t}A~) such that b; E
argmaxa-Eq. u;(a;, p-;).
The fiillowing proposition shows that point-valued solutions satisfying
(CONS) and (RAT) are refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept (cf.
Proposition 2.8 in Peleg and Tijs (1996)).
Proposition 2.1 Let y5 6e a point-valued solution on C satisfying (CONS)
and (RAT). Then ~(G) C NE(G) for every G E T.
Proof Let G-G N,A,u 1E P, a-(a;);EN E ~(G), and i E N. By
(CONS) we have a E~(G{'},{a}) ~d by (RAT) we get that a; is a best
5response to (ar)á~;. Hence a E NE(G). ~
Proposition 2.1 is still true if we replace the axiom of rationality by a weak-
er axiom, which requires that if a profile is selected in some game with
one non-dummy player, then that player must choose a utility maximizing
strategy.
The following axioms are important in the traditional approach:
Definition 2.3 A point-valued solution ~ on F satisfies
i) non-emptáness (NEM) if for every G E P we have ~(G) ~ 0;
ii) restricted non-emptáness (r-NEM) if for every G E P with NE(G) ~ 0
we have ~(G) ~ ~.
In Norde et al. (1996) the Nash equilibrium concept on the class of mixed
extensions ofall finite games is characterized by utility maximization, consis-
tency, and non-emptiness. For finite games this characterization was already
given in Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996). Since the Nash equilibrium set may
be empty in these games the axiom of non-emptiness had to be replaced by
restricted non-emptiness. Both proofs in Norde et al. (1996) and Peleg, Pot-
ters, and Tijs (1996) use a construction which associates with every game G
and every Nash equilibrium x of G an ancestor game H with a unique Nash
equilibrium y such that G may be viewed as a reduced game of H. Since a
point-valued solution, satisfying utility maximization, consistency, and (re-
stricted) non-emptiness should select y in H, one infers, by consistency, that
it allows x in G. In our present setting this argument breaks down because
the ancestor game H has more players than G and reduced games do not
have fewer players. However, we can overcome this problem by adding the
dummy out property.
Definition 2.4 A point-valued solution ~ on F satisfies the dummy out
pmperty (DOP) if for every G-G N, A, u ~ and for every i E N with ~A;~ -
1 and G' -G N`{i},HiEN`{,}Ai,(ui)iEN`{i} ~E P we have ~(G) - A; x
~(G'). Here the payoff functions u} (j E N`{i}) are defined by ui(a-;) -
u~(a-;,a;) where a; is the unique element of A;.
Proposition 2.2 Let ~ be a point-valued solution on F. Then ~ satisfies
(CO.~VS), (RAT), (DOP), and (r-NEM) if and only if ~- NE.
6Proof One easily verifies that NE satisfies (CONS), (RAT), (DOP), and
(r-NEM). In order to prove the only-if-part, suppose that ~ satisfies (CON-
S), (RAT), (DOP), and (r-NEM). We have to show that ~(G) - NE(G)
for every G E P. By Proposition 2.1 we get that ~(G) C NE(G) for every
G E F. For the proof of the converse inclusion, let G-G N, A, u ~E F and
x E NE(G). The ancestor game H-C N', B, v ~E Iis constructed in the
same way as in the proof of Theorem 3 in Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996),
i.e N' - N U{0}, B; - A; for every i E N, Bo - {a,p}, and the payoff
function for player i E N is defined by
r v;(a,a) - u;(Q)
1Jl v;(lj,a) - -1 if a; ~ x;
v;(,Q,a) - 1 if a; - x;
for every a E A and the payoff function for player 0 is defined by
~ vo(a, a) - 2 if a- x
vo(a, a) --1 if a ~ x
vo(p,a) - 0
for every a E A. One easily verifies that (a,x) is the unique Nash equilib-
rium of II. Since ~(H) C NE(H) we infer by (r-NEM) that (~,x) E~(H).
By (CONS) we get (a,x) E ~(Hrv,{(as)}) Since player 0 is a dummy player
in HN,{("s)} we get, by (DOP), x E~(G), which finishes the proof. ~
in Peleg and Tijs (1996) the Nash equilibrium concept is characterized by
one-person rationality, consistency, and converse consistency. This result
could be "duplicated" in the style of Proposition 2.2 by adjusting the defi-
nition of (RAT) (such that it selects all maximizers in games with at most
one non-dummy player) and by giving a definition of converse consistency,
which takes into account the new notion of a reduced game. However, we
will not focus on converse consistency in this paper.
3 Set-valued solutions
We now turn our attention to set-valued solutíons and generalize the axioms,
mentioned in Section 2, such that they apply to set-valued solutions. We
then present some examples and results.
A set-valued solution on P is a map ~i which assigns to every game
C, -G N,A,u ~E I' a collection ~i(G) of product sets, which are non-
empty subsets of A. With every point-valued solution ~ we can associate
7the set-valued solution ~ which assigns to every G E P the collection ~(G) -
{{x} : x E~(G)}. In this way the set-valued solutions can be viewed as a
generalization of the point-valued solutions.
In order to give the definition of the consistency axiom for set-valued
solutions, we first have to define the notion of a reduced game with respect
to some product set and some coalition.
For a G-G N,A,u ~E F, for a coalition S C N, and for a product set
B- H;ENB; C A, B ~ 0 the reduced game ofG with respect to S and B is the
game Gs~B -~ N,H;ESA; x H;EN`SB;,u ~, where u-(u;);EN is the vector
ofrestrictions of the payoff functions u; (i E N) to H;ESA; x H;EN`SB;. Note
that this game belongs to I', that it has ~N~ players, regardless of whether
any B; is a singleton or not, and that, if B is a singleton set, this definition
coincides with the definition of a reduced game in Section 2.
The definitions ofconsistency, rationality, non-emptiness, restricted non-
emptiness, and the dummy out property for set-valued solutions are straight-
forward.
Definition 3.1 A set-valued solution ~ on F satisfies
(i) consistency (CONS) if for every G E T, S C N, B E ~(G) we have
B E y~(Gs.a);
(ii) rationality (RAT) if for every G-G N,A,u 1E I', B E ~(G), i E N,
and b; E B; there exists a~-; E 0(IIiEN`{;}Ai) such that 6; E
argmaxa, ea, u;(a; , Ir-; );
(iii) non-emptiness (NEM) if for every G E F we have ~i(G) ~ 0;
(iv) restricted non-empttness (r-NEM) if for every G E I' with NE(G) ~ 0
we have ~~(G) ~ 0;
(v) the dummy out property (DOP) if for every G-G N, A, u 1E T and for
every i E N with ~A;~ - 1 and G' -G N`{i}, HiE~,`{;}Ai~ (ui)iEN`{;} ~
E I' we have ~i(G) - A; x ~ji(G'). Here, again, the payoff functions
u,i (j E N`{i}) are defined by ui(a-;) - ui(a-;,a;) where a; is the
unique element of A;.
We now give several examples of set-valued solutions. The two first ones are
included for illustrative purposes and the others turn out to be important
for the results in this section.
8Example 3.1 Examples of set-valued solutions are
(i) the solution EMP on F which assigns to every G E I' the empty col-
lection;
(ii) the solution ALL on F which assigns to every G-c N, A, u ~E F the
collection of all non-empty product sets B C A;
(iii) the solution NE on F, associated with the point-valued solution NE,
which assigns to every G E I' the collection of singleton sets that con-
tain a Nash equilibrium;
(iv) the solution BRP on F, which assigns to every G -G N,A,u ~E P
the collection of product sets, having the best response property, i.e.
the collection of product sets B - H;ENB; such that for every i E N
and for every b; E B; there exists a p-; E 0(H~EN`{;}B~) with b; E
argmaxa;ea,u;(a;,!L-t);
(v) the solution BRPt on F, which assigns to every G E F the collection
of maximal product sets, having the best response property;
(vi) the solution BRP- on P, which assigns to every C E F the collection
of minimal product sets, having the best response property.
The first three examples are self-explanatory. BRP is a coarsening of NE.
If x is a Nash equilibrium of a game G then {x} has the best response
property. However, elements of BRP(G) are not required to be singletons,
so BRP(G) is a superset of NE(G) for any game G. BRP} is a refinement
of BRP. For every G E F, BRPt(G) consists of all product sets B with the
best response property, such that there is no product set B' ~ B having this
property. In fact, it follows from the work of Bernheim (1984) and Pearce
(1984) that this last collection contains only one set, namely the product set
of ratzonalizable strategies, where a strategy a; of player i is rationalizable
if there exists a B- II;ENB; with the best response property such that
a; E B; 8 For every G E F, BRP-(G) consists of all product sets B with
the best response property, such that there is no product set B' C B having
this property.
s We note that this definition allows for "correlated beliefs" which is common nowadays
(see e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Definition 55.1)) but was preduded in the original
1984 papers. See Bernheim (1986) for some related discussion.
9In Proposition 2.1 we showed that every point-valued solution, satisfying
(CONS) and (RAT), is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the
following proposition we show that set-valued solutions, satisfying (CONS)
and (RAT), are refinements of BRP.
Proposition 3.1 Let ~ be a set-valued solution on T satisfying (CONS)
and (RAT). Then ~(G) C BRP(G) for every G E I'.
Proof Let G-C N,A,v ~E I'. If ~N~ - 1 then ~(G) C BRP(G) follows
by (RAT). Suppose now that G has at least two players. Let B - B;ENB; E
~i(G) and i E N. By (CONS) we have B E ~(G{i},B) and hence, by (RAT),
we infer that every b; E B; is a best response (of all strategies in A;) to some
belief !a-; E 0(II~EN`{i}B~). So, B E BRP(G). ~
The following prcposition shaws which scluticns in Example 3.1 satisfy
(CONS) and (RAT).
Proposition 3.2 The solutions EMP, NE, BRP, and BRP} satisfy (CONS)
and (RAT).
Proof One easily verifies that EMP satisfies (CONS) and (RAT). In order to
prove that NE and BRP satisíy (CONS) note that a(pure) Nash equilibrium
a in a G E I' remains a Nash equilibrium in the reduced game Gs,{a} for
every S C N and every product set B with the best response property
has still the best responsc property in the reduced game Gs~B for every
S C N. To prove that also BRP} satisfies (CONS) let G E T, S C N, and
R- II;ENR; be the product set of rationalizable strategies in G. Denote
furthermore by R' - IIiENR; the product set of rationalizable strategies in
Gs~R. Since R has the best response property in G, it also has the best
response property in Gs~R. Therefore R; C R; for every i E N. In fact, by
definition of Gs~R, R; - R; for every i E N`S. Since for every i E N`S
any r; E R;(- R;) is a best response to some belief p-; E 0(IIiEN`{i}R~) S
~(nieN`{i}R'~) and for every á E S any r; E R; is a best response to some
belief p-; E 0(II~EN`{;}R'i) the set R' has the best response property in G.
Therefore R' C R and hence R' - R, which proves that R satisfies (CONS).
In order to prove that the solutions NE, BRP, and BRPt satisfy (RAT)
it is sufficient to note that these solutions only select product sets with the
best response property. ~
10An example of an inconsistent refinement of BRY is the solution BRP-.
Example 3.2 Let G-G N,A,u ~E P be the bimatrix game with N-
{1,2}, Ai -{a,b}, Az -{c,d,e}, and u given by
c d e
a 1, 2 1, 1 2, 0
b 2,0 1,1 1,2
One easily verifies that B-{a,b} x{d} is a minimal set having the best
response property. However, with S-{1}, the reduced game of G with




which admits only {a} x {d} and {b} x{d} as minimal sets having the
best response property. Therefore, the solution BRP- on I' does not satisfy
(CONS).
For some finite games G the collection NE(G) may be empty. Therefore
NE satisfies (r-NEM) but not (NEM). However, BRP-,BRP, and BRPt
all satisíy (NEM). In order to see this note that the mixed extension of
any finite strategic game G-G N, A, u ~ possesses a Nash equilibrium
x -(x;);Ew (Nash (1951)). Now let, for every i E N, B; C A; be the
support oí x;. Then the product set B - HiEN B; has the best response
property. So every finite strategic game G admits a product set with the
best response property and, a fortiori, a minimal set with the best response
property. Since (NEM) is a stronger axiom than (r-NEM) we infer that the
solutions BRP-,BRP, and BRPt also satisfy (r-NEM). One easily verifies
that ,~11 solutions in Example 3.1 satisfy (DOP).
If we consider the solutions mentioned in Example 3.1 on T then the
following table summazizes the statements made above:
11EMY ALL NE BRY BKPt BRP-
(CONS) t t t i- t -
(RAT) t - t t t t
(NEM) - t - t t t
(r-NEM) - t t t t t
(DOP) f t t t t t
In the case of point-valued solutions the Nash equilibrium concept NE is
completely characterized on I' by consistency, rationality, restricted non-
emptiness, and dummy out property (Proposition 2.2). The table above
shows that this is not the case for set-valued solutions. These axioms are
not only satisfied by NE but also by BRP and BRPt. Moreover, as seen
above, the two latter solutions even have the virtue of being non-empty for
every finite game.
4 Refining BRP
It has been seen as a set-back to the theories of equilibrium refinements
in the traditional approach that there is no ptoper refinement of the Nash
equilibrium concept satisfying consistency, ratíonality, and non-emptiness.
In Section 3 it was shown that several set-valued solutions satisfy these
properties, and the Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 together imply that BRP is
the unique maximal such solution. In light of this result we suggest a new
approach to the theory of equilibrium refinements: Shift attention from the
point- valued solution NE to the set-valued solution BRP and refine the latter
while preserving consistency and other properties deemed desirable! In this
section we suggest one way of following this line of research.
Say a product set ofstrategies is recommended to the players. One might
argue that this recommendation is not really selC-enforcing unless for every
player i and every belief consistent with the other players confirming with
the recommendation, no strategy outside i's recommended set is optimal for
hirn to use. Basu and Weibull (1991), Hurkens (1995, pp 13-14), and also
1`lNash (1951, pp 290-291) discuss related ideas. Here we make use of Basu
and Weibull's (1991 j notion of a set closed under rational behaváor - a curó
set. The definition of a curb set, as well as of two finer notions that turn
out to be useful, are as follows:
Definition 4.1 Let G-G N,A,u ~E I'. A non-empty product set B-
II;E,ti.B; C A is called
(i) curb if for ever,y i E N and a; E A;, which is a best response to some
belief p-; E 0(II~EN`{~}Bi), we have a; E B;;
(ii) tight curb if B is curb and has the best response property;
(iii) miraimal curb if B is curb and there is no product set B' C B which
is curb.
Basu and Weibull (1991) show that every finite game admits at least one
minimal curb set and that the minimal curb sets and the minimal tight curb
sets coincide. Therefore every finite game also possesses at least one tight
curb set.
Since we are interested in refinements of BRP we will investigate whether
the two set-valued solutions, which select the tight curb and minimal curb
sets respectively, satisfy consistency and other properties. We hence define
the following solutions on I':
t-CURB(G) - {B C A : B is tight curb};
min-CURB(G) - {B C A: B is minimal curb}
for every G-G N,A,u 1E P. Every tight curb set or every minimal
curb set which is singleton contains a strict equilibrium. Therefore t-CURB
and min-CURB may be viewed as set-valued analogues of the point-valued
solution assigning to every game the collection of strict equilibria. Of course
there are finite games without strict equilibria. The following proposition
shows that the solutions t-CURB and min-CURB satisíy (NEM) as well as
(CONS), (RAT), and (DOP).
Proposition 4.1 The solutions t-CURB and min-CURB satisfy (CONS),
(RAT), (NEM), and (DOP).
Proof In order to prove that t-CURB satisfies (CONS) let G-G N, A, u~E
1', B- B;ENB; a tight curb set in G and S C N. Since BRP satisfies
13(COVS) and B has the best response property in G it also has the best
response property in GS~B. Since by changing from G to GS~B no best
responses to belieís in B are deleted B is also curb in GS~B. Hence B is
a tight curb set in GS~B which proves that t-CURB satisfies (CONS). For
the proof of the consistency of min-CURB assume that B- H;E,NB; is a
minimal curb set in C, -~ ;Y, A, u~ and S C.N. Suppose there is B' C B
which is a curb set in GS~B. One easily verifies in that case that B' is a curb
set in G, which contradicts the minimality of B. Hence B is also a minimal
curb set in CS~B which proves the consistency of min-CURB.
Since the solutions t-CURB and min-CURB only select sets with the
best response property both solutions satisfy (RAT).
In Proposition 1 of Basu and Weibull ( 1991) the authors show that every
finite game admits at least one minimal curb set and in Proposition 2 they
show that the minimal curb sets and the minimal tieht curb sets crtinride.
.4s a consequence we get that both solutions t-CURB and min-CURB satisfy
(NEM).
One easily verifies that the solutions t-CURB and min-CURB satisfy
(DOP). ~
Proposition 4.1 illustrates that the research program we have proposed is
feasible. We believe the program promises to deliver solutions that have
cutting power in applications. 'I'o argue this point, consider the following
game which is a special case of a"Burning Money" example discussed by
Hurkens (1996, Figure 2 with c- 1):
e f g h
a 9, 5 9, 5 0, 4 0, 4
6 4, 4 4, 4 6, 7 6, 7
c 8,5 -1,4 8,5 -1,4
d 3, 4 5, 7 3, 4 5, 7
In this game {a} x {e, f} is the unique minimal curb set (see Hurkens (1996,
p 188) for a proof). Note that the strategies c and g are not involved, despite
the fact that (c,g) is a proper equilibrium.s
'Note also that, as observed by Hurkens (1996), iterated elimination of weakly dom-
inated strategies has no cutting power in this game. There are no weakly dominated
strategies.
1,15 Summary
fhe axiom of consistency for point-uolued solutions of strategic games is
introduced in Peleg and Tijs (1996). They show that any consistent point-
valued solution which satisfies a rationality reyuirement must be a refine-
ment of the Nash equilibrium concept. Norde et al. (1996) show that requir-
ing also the solution to be non-empty in games that do possess equilibria
leads to a characterization of the :~ash equilibrium concept. This result
may be taken as troublesome for the theory of equilibrium refinements, or
as suggesting that the axiom of consistency is unduly restrictive.
We argue that set-valued solutions are natural objects of study for the
classical theory of games which is concerned with offering self-enforcing rec-
ommendations to rational players. We extend the axiom of consistency to
apply to such solutions. In the new context the aforementioned problems
disappear, although the Nash equiiibrium concept no Ionger takes center
stage. Any consistent set-valued solution satisfying a rationality require-
ment must be a refinement of BRP, the solution assigning to each game the
collection of sets with the best response property.
BRP itself satisfies these properties and also many refinements do so.
Based on this finding we propose to refine BRP instead of tbe Nash cur-
respondence, while reyuiring that consistency and other properties deerned
desirable are preserved. To exemplify this line of research, we use Basu
and yi'eibull's (1991) notion of a curb set. This leads for example to the
solution min-CURB, the refinement of BRP which selects all product sets
which are minimal curb. This solution has considerable cutting power in
certain games. We show that min-CURB satisfies consistency, a rationality
requirement, and non-emptiness.
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